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Introduction
The new Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 
have to adopt the euro as soon as they meet the Maastricht 
criteria since adoption of the euro is part of the requirement 
for  EU  accession.  Participation  in  the  eurozone  is  in  fact 
mandatory: the clauses that permitted the United Kingdom 
and Denmark not to adopt the euro were provided under 
specific circumstances and were not applicable to the new 
Member States. Yet, the status of new EU Member States as 
‘Member States with a derogation’ (Art. 122 of the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Community, TEC) gives them some 
leeway in setting the target date. In 2007, Slovenia was the 
first country of this group that joined the euro-area; Malta 
and Cyprus followed in 2008; and the latest new Member 
State to adopt the euro was Slovakia in 2009. For the other 
CEEC the timing is still unknown; official announcements 
are not consistent and target dates vary from 2010 to 2015. 
  The purpose of this article is to discuss the requirements 
related to EMU during the different stages of the accession 
process and to reflect upon the impact of the financial crisis 
on eurozone enlargement. The complex and dynamic pro-
cess of enlargement and monetary policy convergence start-
ed well before the EU accession in 2004. The article there-
fore begins with a description of the obligations related to 
EMU during the pre-accession stage and continues with an 
analysis of the implications of EMU upon and after EU ac-
cession. It then concludes with a discussion on the financial 
crisis and its repercussions on the new EU Member States’ 
prospects of joining the eurozone.
Pre-accession Relations, 
EU Accession and Implications of EMU 
At the Copenhagen Summit held in June 1993 the Euro-
pean Council set out how accession would be granted once 
each applicant fulfilled the relevant economic and political 
criteria. These preconditions for EU accession – the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria – also addressed the need for monetary 
policy convergences and included:
1.  The  achievement  of  stable  institutions  guaranteeing 
  democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  respect  for  human  rights 
  and the protection of minorities. 
2.  The existence of a functioning market economy.
3.  The  capacity  to  cope  with  the  pressure  and  market 
  forces likely to be faced within the Union.
4.  Full  acceptance  of  the  acquis  communautaire,  i.e., 
  the ability to take on the obligations of EU membership, 
  including adherence to the aims of political economic   
  and monetary union (cf. Conclusions of the Presidency   
  SN 180/1/93).
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The Adoption of the Euro in 
the New EU Member States:  
Repercussions of the Financial Crisis
Miriam Allam*
The new EU Member States are under the legal obligation to introduce the euro as soon as 
they meet the convergence/Maastricht criteria. However, their status as “Member States with a 
derogation” (Art. 122 TEC) gives them some leeway in setting the target date. In 2007, Slovenia 
was the only country of this group that joined the euro-area; Malta and Cyprus followed in 2008, 
and the latest Member State to adopt the euro was Slovakia in 2009. For the other Central and East 
European Countries (CEEC) the timing is still unknown; official announcements are not consistent 
and target dates vary from 2010 to 2015. This article discusses the obligations related to the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) during the different stages of the EU and eurozone accession 
process, whilst also reflecting upon the impact of the financial crisis on eurozone enlargement 
and addressing the current debate on unilateral euroisation.  As the Copenhagen criteria included the ability of the 
candidate  countries  to  adhere  to  the  aims  of  EMU,  the 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of 
the European Commission launched its pre-accession fiscal 
surveillance mechanism in 2001. This mechanism comprised 
screening  in  the  area  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  with 
respect  to  EU  and  EMU  accession  requirements  and  was 
divided  into  an  annual  debt  and  deficit  notification  and 
a  pre-accession  economic  programme  (PEP)  (European 
Commission 2000b: 5). 
  In  addition  to  the  Copenhagen  criteria 
and in an effort to facilitate the integration 
of  the  accession  countries  into  the  single 
European market (cf. Smith 2004: 122) and 
to develop the financial sector and ensure 
monetary and fiscal discipline, the candidate 
countries had to fulfil the following EMU-
related conditions during the pre-accession 
phase: 
•	 Establishment	of	independent	central	 
  banks and  monetary authorities (Art.  
  108 TEC).1
•	 Prohibition	of	direct	public	sector	 
  financing by the central bank (Art. 104a  
  TEC) and of privileged access 
  of the public sector to financial  
  institutions (Council 
  Regulation TEC No. 3604/93 specifying  
  definitions for Art. 104a TEC).
•	 Liberalisation	of	capital	movements	(Art.	56	TEC).
  Upon accession, all new Member States went straight 
into stage three of EMU2. However, as Member States with 
a derogation, they remain outside the eurozone until they 
meet the convergence criteria. From the day of their acces-
sion the new Member States had to adopt the following 
policies (see European Commission 2000a: 37):
•	 Treatment	of	exchange	rate	policy	as	a	matter	of	common 
   interest and in light of the expected participation in the  
  exchange rate mechanism (Art. 124 TEC).
•	 Avoidance	of	excessive	government	deficits	and	 
  adherence to the relevant provisions of the stability 
  and growth pact (Art. 104 TEC  and Regulations 1055/05  
  and 1056/05).
•	 Participation	in	the	European	System	of	Central	Banks		
	 (ESCB)	from	the	date	of	accession	(Art.	109	TEC).	
•	 Progress	towards	a	high	degree	of	sustainable	con	
  vergence (Art. 121 TEC) and the Maastricht convergence  
  criteria. 
•	 Treatment	of	economic	policies	as	a	matter	of	common		
  concern and coordination of economic policies among  
  Member States through participation in Community  
  procedures (Art. 98 & 99 TEC).
 
  The  latter  point  of  participation  in  the  EU’s  economic   
policy	 coordination	 contains	 the	 Broad	 Economic	 Policy	
Guidelines	(BEPG)	(Art.	99	(2)	TEC)	and	the	multilateral	surveil-
lance	(Art.	99	(3)).	The	BEPG	is	the	central	reference	document	
for the annual assessment of economic policies in the Mem-
ber States. If the Guidelines are not followed, the Council can 
issue  recommendations  to  the  country  concerned  (Art. 
99 (4) TEC). Multilateral surveillance is the procedure that 
allows the EU to monitor and assess national economic de-
velopments and policies. The multilateral surveillance of eco-
nomic policy also comprises the two regulations that form 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). While Member States 
with a derogation are not bound by the full provisions of the 
SGP, they have to submit annual medium-term convergence 
programmes in preparation for EMU in accordance with the 
procedures of the SGP (see European Commission 2001a: 
25). These annual programmes are monitored by the Euro-
pean Commission and peer-reviewed in the Council of Min-
isters of Economics and Finance (ECOFIN); they are subject 
to the excessive deficit procedure but not submitted to pro-
cedure, according to which the Council may apply sanctions. 
  The  status  as  Member  State  with  a  derogation  gives 
the  new  Member  States  some  leeway  in  setting  the  tar-
get date since there is no fixed timetable for the adoption 
of the euro. Of particular importance for setting the target 
date is the requirement for participation in the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism II (ERM) for at least two years and within 
a  15  per  cent  fluctuation  range  against  the  euro  before 
adopting the single currency. Therefore, the earliest possible 
date for an enlargement of the eurozone by the new Mem-
ber States that first joined ERM II on 28 June 2004 (Estonia, 
Lithuania	and	Slovenia),	was	the	end	of	2006	or	the	begin-
ning of 2007, given that the convergence test can only take 
place after the two years of ERM II membership (thus after 
June 2006),3 and which follows the recommendations by the 
European institutions. Following the reports from the Euro-
pean	Commission	and	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	and	
after the consultation of the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil – in the composition of the Heads of State or Government 
(Art. 122 (2)) – decides on a qualified-majority basis whether 
the criteria are sufficiently met and accordingly announces 
the date for the introduction of the euro. The irrevocable 
conversion rate between the respective national currency 
and the euro is then be set by the Council on the basis of a 
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sdecision taken unanimously by the current eurozone mem-
bers and the country concerned. 
  The ERM participation requirement is one of the conver-
gence or Maastricht criteria, as described in article 121 (1) TEC. 
The following convergence criteria need to be fulfilled in   
order to qualify for eurozone membership:
•	 Price	stability:	for	a	year	before	assessment,	the	inflation	  
  rate must not exceed by more than 1.5 per cent that of   
  the three best-performing Member States.
•	 Budget	deficit:	the	budget	deficit	must	not	exceed	3	per	  
  cent of GDP.
•	 National	debt:	government	debt	must	not	exceed	60	per	  
  cent of GDP.
•	 Long-term	 interest	 rates:	 the	 long-term	 interest	 rate 
  should  not  exceed  by  more  than  2  per  cent  the   
  average  of  the  three  Member  States  with  the  lowest 
  inflation rates.
•	 Participation	 in	 the	 Exchange	 Rate	 Mechanism:	 the 
  currency must stay within the narrow ranges of the ERM,   
  with no realignment for at least two years.
  Whereas the Copenhagen criteria set standards related 
to a functioning market economy, the capacity to cope with 
market pressures within the EU and to adhere to the aims 
of political, economic and monetary union, the Maastricht 
criteria were designed to achieve price stability, low long-
term interest rates, low public deficits and exchange rate 
stability. Thus, the Copenhagen criteria focus on real and 
legal-institutional  convergence,  i.e.,  on  convergence  in 
the  economies’  structural  and  institutional  characteristics, 
while the Maastricht criteria place emphasis on the nominal 
convergence of the inflation rates, interest rates and budget 
deficit  GDP-ratios.  In  fact,  the  real  convergence  para- 
meters  of  the 
Maastricht  criteria 
are only secondary 
in  nature  as  their 
fulfilment  may 
promote but does 
not  automatically 
result in structural 
adjustment  and 
real	income	catching	up	(see	Backé	1999:	121).	Accordingly,	
the  Copenhagen  and  Maastricht  criteria  follow  two 
distinctive  aims  and  types  of  benchmarks.  In  addition, 
whereas the Copenhagen criteria are also accession criteria, 
meeting  the  Maastricht  criteria  is  not  a  precondition  for 
EU  accession.  Nevertheless,  prior  to  their  EU  accession, 
the Maastricht criteria put pressure on the then candidate 
countries, since they had already paid close attention to the 
requirements when designing domestic fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policies. Scholars argue that this was because 
the Maastricht criteria had a meaning for the new Member 
States, especially in post-communist Europe, beyond that 
of  defining  the  overall  framework  for  a  sound  monetary 
and fiscal policy: fulfilment demonstrated readiness for EU   
accession and the definitive break with the communist past 
(Lavrac	1999:	116).	Indeed,	as	a	recent	study	on	public	opinion	
on  eurozone  membership  in  post-communist  countries 
demonstrates,  eurozone  membership  may  still  “serve  as 
focal  points  that  provide  guidance  on  the  future  path  of 
transition as the adoption of the euro is viewed as the necessary 
incentive to continue with the reform process, to leave the past 
behind and to establish institutional trust as well as personal 
 security. This implies that the opinion on the euro is not merely 
an expression about an EU issue. Instead, it is in large part 
a function to vote on free market reforms” (Allam and Goerres 
2008: 24).
  Moreover,  after  EU  accession,  the  commitment  to  the 
Maastricht  criteria  develops  a  further  dimension  as  the 
Council can decide not to provide funds for new projects 
to the EU Member State concerned if it “has failed to take 
action to correct an excessive deficit or has not respected 
the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact”  (Jones  2006:  97;  Council 
Regulations  1164/1994  and  1264/1999).  The  technical 
implications of EMU accession therefore have a considerable 
impact on the economies and politics of the new Member 
States. Indeed, the prospect of EMU membership is guiding 
and constraining today’s new Member States’ monetary and 
fiscal policies. Certainly, EMU membership brings benefits 
and  would  enhance  the  new  Member  States’  economic 
and political credibility, which are especially important for 
attracting  international  investors;  but  the  adherence  to 
the	Maastricht	criteria	also	entails	adjustment	costs	(Buiter	
and Grafe 2004). Here, the new Member States, especially 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), face a policy dilemma 
arising from the intention to meet the Maastricht criteria at 
an early stage of transition on the one hand, and the need 
for structural reforms on the other. This is due to the new EU 
Member States in post-communist Europe still encountering 
special transition problems that require high levels of public 
spending and investment (e.g. on infrastructure), but who 
stand in conflict with the EMU’s deficit criterion.4 In addition, 
bringing  down 
the  inflation  rate 
and  meeting  the 
Maastricht Treaty’s 
stable  exchange 
rate  criterion  are 
to a certain extent 
i n co m p a t i b l e 
(cf.	 Balassa	 1964;	
Samuelson 1964).5 During the catching-up process, the CEEC 
will either be under enormous inflationary pressure or have 
an appreciating nominal exchange rate, deriving from the 
need to reform expenditure and from faster growth than 
in the euro area. In addition to the question of economic 
burden-sharing,  the  adoption  of  the  euro  touches  upon 
issues of state sovereignty and culture (Jones 2002: 23), as 
giving up its national currency is related to the risk of losing a 
‘symbolic marker in nation-building efforts’ (Risse 2003: 487); 
an aspect which should not be underestimated especially 
when studying the political economy of new democracies.   
Eurosceptic politicians may use this argument to mobilise 
public  opinion  and  influence  the  political  agenda.  For 
example, the Czech President Vaclav Klaus, who has a very 
sceptical  view  on  EMU,  refers  to  the  euro  and  Maastricht 
Treaty  as  a  forced  imposition  of  a  new  European  identity 
(Bugge	2000:	213).	
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In addition to the question of economic 
burden-sharing, the adoption of the 
euro touches upon issues of state 
sovereignty and culture   Related to the fear of losing the national identity is the 
argument made by Vaclav Klaus that EMU will mean the loss   
of  the  just-regained  sovereignty  to  the  bureaucratic 
and	 centralised	 Brussels	 (Interviews	 Klaus	 Handelsblatt	
17/11/1992; Radio FreeEurope 10/02/2004).
Repercussions of the Financial Crisis on Eurozone 
Enlargement
As discussed above, technical implications of EMU accession 
have a considerable impact on the economies and policies 
of  the  new  EU  Member  States.  Understanding  the  euro-
adoption  strategies  merely  on  the  basis  of  economic 
accounts  and  cost/benefit  analyses,  however,  would 
overlook  the  political  reality.  In  fact,  the  real  difficulty 
in  reforming  the  economy  is  political,  given  that  policy 
adjustment involves significant costs, especially at the outset 
of reforms. It is therefore no surprise that while all euro-
adoption strategies as such aim to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, 
the strategies of the new Member States differ in terms of 
their target dates and political support (for a discussion on 
the domestic political context see Dyson 2006). Slovenia, 
Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia are the only countries so far that 
have already adopted the euro; the timing is still unknown 
for the other new Member States; official announcements 
are not consistent and target dates vary from 2010 to 2015.
 
  In fact, the target dates have not been static, but have 
changed on a number of occasions. For example, by the late 
1990s, the Czech Republic and Hungary announced target 
dates for entry into the eurozone for 2005 and 2006 (Jarai 
2001). However, given that at that time accession negotia-
tions had not been concluded and no date for EU accession 
had yet been set, the target dates for 2005 were quite op-
timistic and, as later became clear, unrealistic. In 2002, the 
Czech Republic, gave up plans for a quick approach to euro-
zone entry and the Spidla government announced that the 
adoption of the euro would only be possible by 2010 or 2011 
(Financial Times 09/10/2002). In January 2009, former Prime 
Minister  Topolanek  then  declared  that  the  government 
would announce the official target date only in November 
2009 (Radio Prague 02/01/2009). Gradually, Hungary also 
readjusted  its  strategies  and  presented  its  official  euro-
adoption strategy in August 2003, which called for eurozone 
entry	by	2008	(National	Bank	of	Hungary	2003).	In	May	2004,	
the Hungarian government submitted its first convergence 
programme and readjusted its strategy stating that, with the 
present macroeconomic problems encountered by the Hun-
garian economy, eurozone entry would be possible only by 
2010. This target date has been postponed again and ana-
lysts	estimate	an	adoption	of	the	euro	by	2014	(Bloomberg,	
16/04/2009).
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Table 1: Monetary and exchange rate strategies in the new EU, non-eurozone Member States
Exchange rate regime Currency Features
Currency board
Bulgaria Currency board to the euro Lev Introduced in 1997
Estonia Currency board to the euro 
and member of ERM II with 
0% margin since 2004
Kroon Introduced in 1992
Lithuania Currency board to the euro 
and member of ERM II with 
0% margin since 2004
Litas Introduced in 1994; Re-pegged from the 
US dollar to the euro in February 2002
Conventional fixed peg
Latvia Peg to the euro (earlier 
pegged to Special Drawing 
Right SDR) and member of 
the ERM II with 1% margin
Lats
Managed floating
Romania Managed float  Leu Currency basked (US dollar, euro) is used 
informally as reference. Inflation targeting
Free float
Czech Republic Free float Koruna Inflation targeting 2%-4% by end-2005
Hungary Free float. Until February 2008 
unilateral shadowing of ERM II 
(peg to the euro with +- 15% 
fluctuation bands).
Forint Exchange rate regime combined with 
inflation targeting 3%
Poland Free float Złoty Inflation targeting: 2.5% +-1%
Adapted from Rollo (2006: 63), updated by the author	 	 Likewise,	 the	 exchange	 rate	 regimes	 have	 been	
amen-ded on a number of occasions (Corker et al. 2000; Dar-
vas and Szapary 2008). All CEEC have had to deal with prob-
lems arising from strong capital inflows putting more and 
more pressure on the money supply, and most central banks 
reacting with costly but ineffective sterilisation operations. 
At the outset of the transition process, Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic, for example, opted for peg strategies. 
However, with growing external imbalances (foreign trade 
and the current account balances are still deteriorating in 
most  of  the  new  EU 
Member  States)  and 
aninflation  targeting 
strategy  as  a  goal   
of  monetary  policy, 
these  exchange  rate  regimes  were  later  abandoned  or 
radically adjusted (Hallerberg et al. 2002: 345). Table 1 shows 
the current monetary and exchange rate strategies in the 
new Member States that are not yet eurozone members. 
The exchange rate regimes can be divided into countries 
with euro-based currency boards and conventional fixed 
peg	(Bulgaria,	Estonia,	Latvia	and	Lithuania)	and	countries	
with  flexible  exchange  rates  (Czech  Republic,  Hungary, 
Poland and Romania). 
  The  currencies  of  the  new  EU  Member  States  with 
flexible  exchange  rates  depreciated  between  29%  and 
17% from July 2008 to March 2009, with the Polish Złoty 
depreciating  the  most  during  this  period.  It  is  therefore 
no surprise that the high volatility of the Polish Złoty has 
fuelled the debate of Poland’s eurozone membership. While 
politicians have kept a low key debate on eurozone accession, 
the financial crisis has mitigated opposition to adopting 
the euro. The Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced 
in December 2008 that Poland should strive to adopt the 
euro as early as 2012. This is an important turn in the govern- 
ment’s  position  given  that  it  has  so  far 
refrained from announcing a clear target date. 
Similar debates are also taking place in the 
other CEEC. Indeed, given the volatility on the 
exchange rate market with sharp depreciations 
of most CEE currencies and stronger market 
disturbances  in  the  past  months,  eurozone 
membership has gained in attractiveness as 
it  is  perceived  to  provide  protection  during 
times of financial crises. Risk aversion has led to a withdrawal 
of capital from emerging market economies. In addition 
to a decrease in FDI and the related negative impact on 
the  economies  in  CEEC,  a  high  portion  of  the  credited 
granted to households and private business has been in 
foreign currency and mainly in euro. The foreign currency 
borrowing was encouraged by lower interest rates in the 
eurozone as compared to the domestic interest rates. Equally, 
some  CEEC  have  high  euro-denominated  foreign  debt 
levels  making  currency  depreciation  especially  painful   
(Berger	2004:	15).	The	most	dramatic	events	took	place	in	
Hungary	in	October	2008	and	in	Latvia	and	Romania	earlier	
this year. The three states are on the brink of financial collapse 
and  are  relying  on  financial  bailouts  from  international 
organisations. In fact, the catastrophic default and the high 
potential for contagion could only be avoided as a result of 
loans from the IMF and financial support from the EU. 
  The  combination  of  higher  debt  service,  job  losses 
and economic downturn led to a sharp increase in non-
performing loans. The resulting credit crunch is reinforced 
by  the  fact  that  the 
percentage  of  for-
eign  banks  in  CEEC 
is  very  high.  Since 
their  mother  banks 
in the West are already experiencing financial difficulties in 
their home countries, they are restricting funding to their 
branches	in	CEEC.	By	extension,	banks	have	therefore	cut	
back lending and increased real lending rates, perpetuat-
ing the credit squeeze; in turn, this exacerbates the eco-
nomic decline. A speeding up of the eurozone accession 
process is therefore in the interest of the countries, since 
through  irrevocably  fixing  the  domestic  currency  to  the 
euro, CEEC debt service would no longer be dependent on 
currency  fluctuations.  Indeed,  the  eurozone  is  perceived 
as a safe harbour in a stormy sea [read currency fluctua-
tion and capital flight]. In a leaked report, the IMF has even 
recommended  a  unilateral  euroisation  (Financial  Times 
6 April 2009).6 Euroisation became the axiom for an adop-
tion of the euro as legal tender without a previous conver-
gence process and without having a common central bank. 
The  main  advantages  of  euroisation  may  include  much 
lower  interest  rates  and  the  elimination  of  currency  risk 
(cf.	Meade	et	al.	2002).	Yet,	the	ECB	strongly	rejects	the	idea	
as unilateral euroisation bypasses the convergence criteria 
and therefore eases the pressure for the new EU Member 
States to attain fiscal consolidation and low 
inflation. 
  In addition, euroisation weakens the EU’s 
institutional framework by undermining the 
treaty criteria and creates the risk of decreasing 
confidence in the euro. Euroisation is therefore 
neither likely nor desirable. Considering the 
tight trade links between EU Member States, 
adopting the euro in Central Europe would certainly be in 
the interest of the existing eurozone Member States as this 
would stimulate trade creation. However, a speeding up of 
the eurozone accession process should not come at the cost 
of undermining the convergence criteria.
  However,  with  higher  inflation  rates  due  to  currency 
depreciation and growing fiscal deficits due to lower eco-
nomic  activities,  compliance  with  the  Maastricht  criteria 
has moved to a further distance in some CEEC. Since the 
start  of  the  financial  crisis,  governments  have  launched   
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The eurozone is perceived as a safe 
harbour in a stormy seaTable 2: Maastricht criteria before the crisis
Inflation rate Long-term	
government 
interest rates 
(bond yields)
General 
government 
surplus or 
deficit
General 
government 
gross debt
April 2008 April 2008 2007 2007
Average of 
3 lowest EU 
member 
1.9 Average of 3 
lowest 
inflation 
countries
4.42
Reference 
value
3.4 Reference 
value
6.42 Reference 
value
-3.0 Reference 
value
60.0
Malta 1.9 Euro area 4.3 Bulgaria 3.4 Estonia 3.4
Slovakia 2.4 Slovakia 4.46 Cyprus 3.3 Latvia 9.7
Euro area 2.6 Slovenia 4.47 Estonia 2.8 Romania 13.0
Cyprus 3.2 Lithuania 4.59 Latvia 0.0 Lithuania 17.3
Poland 3.4 Cyprus 4.6 Slovenia -0.1 Bulgaria 18.2
Czech 
Republic
4.8 Czech 
Republic
4.72 Euro area -0.6 Slovenia 24.1
Slovenia 5.0 Malta 4.77 Lithuania -1.2 Czech 
Republic
28.7
Romania 6.4 Bulgaria 4.8 Czech 
Republic
-1.6 Slovakia 29.4
Hungary 7.3 Latvia 5.93 Malta -1.8 Poland 45.2
Lithuania 8.0 Poland 5.99 Poland -2.0 Cyprus 59.8
Estonia 8.8 Romania 7.34 Slovakia -2.2 Malta 62.6
Bulgaria 10.1 Hungary 8.02 Romania -2.5 Hungary 66.0
Latvia 13.0 Estonia n.a. Hungary -5.5 Euro area 66.6
Source: Szapary (2009)
32
www.eipa.eu
T
h
e
 
A
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
N
e
w
 
E
U
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
Table 3: Maastricht criteria in December 2008 and January 2009
Inflation rate Long-term	
government 
interest rates 
(bond yields)
General 
government 
surplus or 
deficit
General 
government 
gross debt
December 
2008
December 
2008
2009 (19 
January 
forecast of 
DG ECOFIN)
2009 (19 
January 
forecast of 
DG ECOFIN)
Average of 
3 lowest EU 
member 
2.6 Average of 3 
lowest 
inflation 
countries
3.57
Reference 
value
4.1 Reference 
value
5.57 Reference 
value
-3.0 Reference 
value
60.0
Euro area 3.3 Euro area 3.71 Bulgaria 2.0 Estonia 6.1
Slovakia 3.9 Malta 4.17 Cyprus -0.6 Bulgaria 12.2
Poland 4.2 Czech 
Republic
4.30 Czech 
Republic
-2.5 Lithuania 20.0
Cyprus 4.4 Slovenia 4.56 Malta -2.6 Romania 21.1
Malta 4.7 Cyprus 4.6 Slovakia -2.8 Slovenia 24.8
Slovenia 5.5 Slovakia 4.72 Hungary -2.8 Czech 
Republic
29.4
Hungary 6.0 Poland 5.7 Lithuania -3.0 Slovakia 30.0
Czech 
Republic
6.3 Bulgaria 7.76 Estonia -3.2 Latvia 30.4
Romania 7.9 Hungary 8.31 Slovenia -3.2 Cyprus 46.7
Estonia 10.6 Romania 8.38 Poland -3.6 Poland 47.7
Lithuania 11.1 Lithuania 9.0 Euro area -4.0 Malta 64.0
Bulgaria 12.0 Latvia 9.03 Latvia -6.3 Euro area 72.7
Latvia 15.3 Estonia n.a. Romania -7.5 Hungary 73.8
Source: Szapary (2009)33
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rescue packages consisting mainly of government guaran-
tees and increased spending on major infrastructure projects. 
Because	of	the	economic	recession,	the	revenue	side	will	be	
characterised by a deterioration of tax revenue allocation 
due to huge losses in corporate enterprise productivity and 
growing unemployment. This all will translate into higher   
fiscal  deficit  in  2009  (see Table  3).  Indeed,  while  in  2007   
Hungary was the only country not to comply with the Maas-
tricht deficit criterion (see Table 2), it is expected that all but 
the	Czech	Republic	and	Bulgaria	will	have	a	deficit	above	
-3% in 2009 (see Table 3). The relatively low fiscal deficit in 
transition countries in the past few years was not due to low 
structural deficits but mainly due to the exceptionally high 
growth rates of the GDP between 5-10%. Certainly, with a 
slow-down in economic activities, the GDP growth rate will 
decline,  revenue  collection  will  deteriorate  and  the  state 
deficit will further increase.
  To conclude, while the financial crisis has increased the 
attractiveness of eurozone membership as it is perceived to 
be a ‘safe harbour in a stormy sea’, the currency depreciation 
and slow-down in economic activities make it more difficult 
for the new EU Member States to comply with the Maas-
tricht criteria. The current debate on unilateral euroisation in 
CEEC, sparked by the IMF, underlines the dramatic situation 
in some of the new EU Member States that are on the brink 
of a financial collapse. However, unilateral euroisation bears 
potential risk for European integration as it undermines the 
institutional framework and unity of the EU. Euroisation is 
therefore neither likely nor desirable. Rather than bypassing 
the Maastricht criteria, the debate should concentrate on 
possible adjustments of the current rules in hard times.
NOTES
*  Miriam Allam, Researcher, European Centre for Public Financial 
  Management, EIPA Warsaw.
  The  author  would  like  to  thank  Jacek  Tomkiewicz  for  his   
  comments on an earlier version of this article.
1  All  articles  refer  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European   
  Community  as  amended  by  the  Treaty  on  European  Union   
  signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam   
  signed on 2 October 1997 and the Treaty of Nice, signed on 
  26 February 2001.
2  Stage one started for the then Member States in 1990 with the   
  complete abolition of capital controls as under Article 56 of the   
  TEC. In stage two (1 January 1994 - 31 December 1998) Member   
  States had to implement measures to achieve compliance with   
  the EMU requirements to be able to enter EMU on 1 January   
  1999. Stage three of EMU began on 1 January 1999 with the   
  introduction of the euro in financial markets.
3  The current members of the eurozone introduced a transition   
  period  of  three  years  between  EMU  accession  and  the   
  introduction  of  euro  cash.  The  new  Member  States  have   
  indicated their intention to follow a so-called “big bang” scenario   
  in which the adoption of the euro will happen at the same   
  time as the introduction of euro coins and bills (see European   
  Commission 2004: 2-5).
4  Given  that  the  Maastricht  criteria  were  not  designed  for   
  transition  economies,  scholars  argue  that  the  convergence   
  criteria and the SGP miss “the economic realities of countries   
  that differ from the EU average as regards to their expected   
  inflation and real GDP growth rates and their inherited stocks   
	 of	environmental	and	public	sector	capital”	(Buiter	and	Grafe	  
  2004: 68).  For a discussion on the effects of the ‘EU fiscal accession 
   shock’ and alternative fiscal rules for the new EU Member States   
  see Nuti (2006).
5	 This	can	be	explained	by	what	is	called	the	Balassa-Samuelson	  
	 effect.	The	Balassa-Samuelson	effect	describes	the	mechanism	  
  by  which  an  increase  (larger  than  in  other  countries)  in   
  productivity of tradable goods relative to non-tradable goods   
	 causes	 an	 appreciation	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 (Balassa	 1964,	  
  Samuelson  1964).  If  productivity  growth  in  one  country  is   
  higher than in another, inflation will be higher in the former.   
  Thus,  as  the  transition  countries  catch  up  with  higher  GDP   
  growth  rates,  their  price  level  also  catches  up  so  that  their   
  inflation rates are also higher. For a discussion on the extent   
  to which the exchange rate appreciation and inflation in CEEC is   
	 attributable	 to	 the	 Balassa-Samuelson	 effect	 see	 Egert	 et	 al.	  
  (2003); Mihaljek and Klau (2004).
6  The  debate  about  unilateral  euroisation  is  not  new  but  has   
  been conducted since the late 1990s. At the forefront of the   
  debate in the 1990s were Polish academics and policy makers.   
  The most prominent examples of Polish academics favouring   
	 euroisation	are	Andrzej	Bratkowski	and	Jacek	Rostowski	(2002);	  
  the most prominent politician is the former Finance Minister   
	 Kołodko.	Andrzej	Bratkowski	(1991)	and	Jacek	Rostowski	(1989- 
  1991) were both economic advisors to the Deputy Prime Minister   
	 and	Finance	Minister	Leszek	Balcerowicz.	Andrzej	Bratkowski	  
	 was	deputy	President	of	the	National	Bank	of	Poland	from	2001- 
  2004. Since 2007, Jacek Rostowski is Finance Minister of Poland. 34
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